Check that a record is exactly what the register published.
Every public OCC Agent Record and every public attestation is signed by the register. Paste one below to check it has not been changed since it was published. A valid signature proves who published the content and that it is unaltered. It does not prove the content is true, and it is not certification, approval or endorsement.
Paste a signed record or attestation
Register signing, in four steps
The register serialises the record with keys sorted and no whitespace (RFC 8785 style), so the same content always produces the same bytes.
It signs those bytes twice as JSON Web Signatures (RFC 7515): once with Ed25519 (alg EdDSA) and once with ML-DSA-65 (NIST FIPS 204, post-quantum). Each key id is the RFC 7638 thumbprint of its public key. Either signature on its own proves the content.
record.jws is the record as a compact JWS (add ?alg=ML-DSA-65 for the post-quantum one). record.json carries detached JWS values in the X-OCC-Signature and X-OCC-Signature-PQ headers. attestations.json embeds signature and signature_pq in each attestation.
Use this page, POST to /occ/verify-record/check, or verify offline with a JOSE library and the keys at /occ/jwks.json. The page reports which method it checked.
Signed for the decade records need to last
Agent records and attestations may need to be checkable for many years. A large enough quantum computer could forge today’s elliptic-curve signatures, so the register adds a second, quantum-resistant signature to everything it publishes (comment register entry OCC-E-015). Ed25519 stays for compatibility with existing tools; ML-DSA-65 covers the longer term. Verifiers can check either or both.
NIST published its first three post-quantum cryptography standards: FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA).
Read the source ↗NIST’s draft transition plan deprecates today’s quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms, including the elliptic-curve signatures used here, after 2030 and disallows them after 2035.
Read the source ↗ASD’s guidance for Australian organisations is to stop using traditional asymmetric cryptography by the end of 2030.
Read the source ↗Why there is no separate “quantum AI” profile: OCC classifies agents by what they can do, the authority they hold and the impact they can have, not by the hardware they run on. An agent running on quantum hardware is assessed with the same AIH-12, AIT-12 and GUARD criteria as any other.
How the register manages its signing keys
The register holds one Ed25519 key and one ML-DSA-65 key. Both public keys are in /occ/jwks.json with their key ids. Private keys never leave the register’s server environment.
Keys are rotated when the algorithm guidance changes, when custody changes, or at once if compromise is suspected. A new key is added to the key set before it is first used.
A retired public key stays in the key set, marked retired, so records signed before a rotation can still be checked. Records are re-signed with the current keys each time they are served.
A compromised key is removed from the key set and the change is announced in the comment register and change log. Signatures made with it should no longer be relied on.
Open decision: who holds the register signing keys long-term, including whether custody moves to an independent foundation. Until that is decided, the keys are held by the register operator. Comments are welcome.