Framework overview
Protocol · Incident & Disclosurev0.1 · Draft for public comment · 2 October 2026

When an agent fails, the record should say so — plainly, on time, and in public.

The Open Conformance Coalition (OCC) Incident & Disclosure protocol defines how an operator records an agent failure, how quickly it is disclosed, and how the lesson is captured. Public incidents appear in the agent’s OCC Agent Record under incidents[] and on its register entry, and may be analysed in the Assurance Observatory.

Severity

Four severities, with disclosure windows

SeverityMeaningNotifyPublish
S1 · CriticalSerious harm to people, rights, money or critical services; or the agent acted outside its mandate and could not be stopped promptly.Accountable person immediately; OCC secretariat and affected parties within 72 hours.Public record within 15 days. Cannot be hidden. Record is suspended pending review.
S2 · MajorReal harm that was contained, or an action beyond declared authority, or a failed revocation.Accountable person within 24 hours; OCC secretariat within 7 days.Public record within 30 days. Cannot be hidden. Re-opens the record (material change).
S3 · ModerateA control failed without harm, or a near miss that would have been S1/S2.Logged by the operator within 7 days.Public by default within 90 days; may be held private with a stated reason.
S4 · MinorUnexpected behaviour with no harm and no control failure.Logged by the operator.Optional. Summarised at reassessment.

Windows are proposed defaults for comment. Where the law sets a shorter deadline, the law applies.

Incident status

Open → Contained → Resolved → Closed

Open

Detected and being handled. Harm may be ongoing.

Contained

Harm has stopped; the cause is not yet fixed.

Resolved

The cause is fixed and affected parties have a remedy route.

Closed

Lessons recorded. Nothing further is expected.

An incident cannot be closed until its lessons and changes are recorded.

Specification

Incident fields

Incident ID
id
RequiredStable reference, e.g. OCC-IN-7K2M-Q9XA.
Severity
severity
RequiredS1–S4, as defined below. When in doubt, choose the higher.
Status
status
Requiredopen, contained, resolved or closed.
Title
title
RequiredOne line a non-specialist can understand.
Dates
occurred_on / detected_on
RequiredWhen it happened and when it was noticed. The gap between them is itself evidence.
What happened
summary
RequiredPlain account of the agent’s actions, in order.
Impact
impact
OptionalWho or what was affected, and how much. Say if unknown.
5 As affected
five_as
OptionalWhich of Authority, Access, Activity, Action, Accountability failed.
OWASP ASI risks
owasp_asi
OptionalWhich OWASP Agentic Top 10 risks (ASI01–ASI10) the incident involved. See the crosswalk.
Causal role (AIR)
air.causal_role
Optionalagent_acted, ai_as_target or human_acted_on_output — the Agent Incident Registry coding of who acted.
Outcome (AIR)
air.outcome
Optionalrealized_harm, near_miss or demonstrated_capability. Keeps real harm apart from tests and proofs of concept.
Disclosure class (AIR)
air.disclosure_class
Optionalin_the_wild, safety_failure, disclosed_vulnerability or research_demo.
AIR cross-reference
air.ref
OptionalThe AIR-YYYY-NNNN identifier if the event is also catalogued in the Agent Incident Registry.
Containment
containment
OptionalWhat stopped it — including whether the T-RUE revocation route was used and how long it took.
Lessons and changes
learning
OptionalWhat changed as a result. Required before an incident is closed.
Disclosed on
disclosed_on
OptionalThe date the incident became public on the record.
Incident or hazard
event_type
OptionalOECD distinction: an incident caused actual harm; a hazard is an event that could plausibly have led to one. Near misses are usually hazards.
OECD coding
oecd.*
OptionalHarm types, affected stakeholders, jurisdictions and the AI system’s role, aligned to the OECD common reporting framework for AI incidents.
Legal reporting
regulatory.*
OptionalThe legal regime that applies (if any), the EU AI Act Art. 73 class, the date you became aware, and when the initial and follow-up reports were made.
OECD-aligned coding

Code it once, in shared terms

Optional fields let an operator code an incident in terms that line up with the OECD’s definitions of AI incidents and hazards and its proposed common reporting framework. An operator can also record whether a legal reporting duty applies, such as EU AI Act Article 73, and the dates they became aware and reported. The table below is public legal information only.

Event type event_type
  • Incident — actual harm occurred incident
  • Hazard — could plausibly have led to harm hazard
Role of the AI system oecd.ai_system_role
  • Directly caused it direct_cause
  • Contributed to it contributing_factor
  • Failed to prevent it (a safeguard role) failed_safeguard
  • Was the target (e.g. attacked or misused) target
Type of harm oecd.harm_types[]
  • Physical (injury or death) physical
  • Psychological psychological
  • Economic or property economic_property
  • Reputational reputational
  • Environmental environmental
  • Human or fundamental rights (incl. privacy) human_rights
  • Public interest (incl. critical infrastructure, democratic processes) public_interest
Affected stakeholders oecd.affected_stakeholders[]
  • Consumers / users consumers
  • Workers workers
  • Children children
  • Businesses businesses
  • Government / public bodies government
  • General public general_public
  • Other other
Legal reporting regime regulatory.regime
  • No legal reporting duty identified none_identified
  • EU AI Act Art. 73 (serious incident, high-risk AI) eu_ai_act_art73
  • GDPR Art. 33 (personal data breach — 72 hours, shown as 3 days) gdpr_art33
  • Australia Notifiable Data Breaches scheme au_ndb
  • Sector regulator rule sector
  • Other other
EU AI Act Art. 73 classReport no later thanBasis
Serious incident (general) general15 days after awarenessArt. 73(2): immediately after a causal link is established or reasonably likely, and no later than 15 days after awareness.
Death of a person death10 days after awarenessArt. 73(4): no later than 10 days after awareness.
Widespread infringement or critical-infrastructure disruption widespread_or_critical2 days after awarenessArt. 73(3): no later than 2 days after awareness.
  • Art. 73 applies to providers of high-risk AI systems placed on the EU market, from the date those obligations apply to the system. Check whether it applies to you.
  • An initial report that is incomplete may be submitted first, followed by a complete report (Art. 73(5)).
  • Where any law sets a shorter deadline, the law applies. This table is public information, not legal advice.
Not a regulatory filing
An OCC incident entry is a public record, not a report to a regulator. OCC never files reports for anyone, does not calculate legal deadlines and does not give legal advice. Operators remain responsible for meeting their own legal duties; where the law sets a deadline, the law applies.
Disclosure contact

A monitored address for reports, published with the record

A report about an agent is only useful if it reaches someone who can act. Each organisation in the portal can declare an incident and vulnerability disclosure contact — an email address or web form, with an optional phone number and disclosure policy. It is shown on every public register entry, included in the Agent Record as disclosure_contact, and listed in a machine-readable directory. An OCC reviewer can mark a contact as checked once a test message reached a monitored inbox; changing the email or web form clears that mark. A checked contact is not a review of the agent.

Principles

How disclosure works

Blameless, not nameless

Incidents are written to learn from, not to punish individuals. The operator and the agent are still named.

Serious incidents are public

S1 and S2 incidents cannot be held private. An operator may delay publication only within the stated window, and only to protect affected people.

Feeds the Agent Record

Every public incident appears in the agent’s record under incidents[] and on its public register entry, alongside the evidence.

Feeds the Observatory

OCC may analyse public incidents in the Assurance Observatory to test whether the framework would have predicted or prevented them.

Not a regulatory filing

This protocol does not replace legal reporting duties (for example under the EU AI Act Art. 73 or privacy breach laws). Meet those first; record here as well.

Correction, not deletion

Incident entries can be corrected and updated. They are not deleted by operators.

Example

A fictional S2 incident, as it appears in incidents[]

{
  "id": "OCC-IN-EXMP-0001",
  "severity": "S2",
  "status": "resolved",
  "title": "Procurement agent issued a purchase order above its approval limit",
  "occurred_on": "2026-09-12",
  "detected_on": "2026-09-13",
  "summary": "A supplier changed a quote format. The agent read a unit price as a total and raised a purchase order roughly ten times above its approval limit. The limit was enforced in the prompt, not at the payment tool.",
  "impact": "One order of about A$48,000 sent to a supplier; cancelled before fulfilment. No payment made.",
  "five_as": [
    "Authority",
    "Action"
  ],
  "owasp_asi": [
    "ASI02"
  ],
  "air": {
    "causal_role": "agent_acted",
    "outcome": "near_miss",
    "disclosure_class": "safety_failure"
  },
  "containment": "Revoked the agent’s purchasing credential through the revocation endpoint in 6 minutes; supplier contacted the same day.",
  "learning": "Approval limit moved into the purchasing tool itself. Declared vs effective authority reconciled again on 2026-09-20.",
  "disclosed_on": "2026-09-25"
}
Disclosure is not a finding
Recording an incident is what a responsible operator does. It is not, by itself, a finding against the operator, and a record with no incidents is not a statement that the agent is safe.