Framework overview
Profile · Evidence & Attestationv0.1 · Draft for public comment · 2 October 2026

Evidence you can check, attestations that say what they did not check.

The Open Conformance Coalition (OCC) Evidence & Attestation profile defines how a piece of evidence filed against an AIT-12 control is bound to its artefact, who vouches for it, and how much weight it carries. It works with the six AIE-12 evidence classes and feeds the evidence[] array of the OCC Agent Record. An attestation supports a claim. It is not certification, approval or endorsement.

Who attests

Three attestation levels

A1
Self-attested

The operator attests to its own evidence.

Useful and expected. Carries the least weight; never sufficient on its own above T4.

A2
Second-party attested

A party with a relationship to the operator — a customer, a deployer, a contracted tester.

Stronger than self-attestation. The relationship must be declared.

A3
Independently attested

A party with no commercial or reporting relationship to the operator.

The strongest level. Independence is declared and can be challenged in the review register.

How evidence is weighed

Class first, attestation second

Weight follows the AIE-12 class (what kind of evidence it is), then the attestation level (who stands behind it). A3 on an assertion is still an assertion.

AIE-12 classWhat it is
1 · AssertionA statement by the implementer. Nothing has been checked.
2 · DemonstrationShown working, under conditions chosen by the implementer.
3 · Documented caseA recorded real-world instance, with enough detail for someone else to examine.
4 · Reproducible testA test someone else can re-run and get the same result.
5 · Controlled pilotAssessed in a bounded live deployment, with stated conditions and published failures.
6 · Independent reviewExamined by a party with no stake in the result, who publishes the findings.
Specification

Attestation fields

Profile version
occ_attestation
RequiredAlways "0.1" for this draft.
Subject record
subject.record_id
RequiredThe record_id of the OCC Agent Record the evidence supports.
Control
subject.control
RequiredThe AIT-12 control the evidence is filed against, e.g. "T5 · revocation tested".
AIE-12 class
evidence.class
RequiredOne of the six AIE-12 evidence classes.
Evidence digest
evidence.digest
RequiredA SHA-256 digest of the evidence artefact, written "sha256:<64 hex>". Lets anyone confirm the artefact has not changed since it was attested.
Location
evidence.location
OptionalWhere the artefact can be obtained. May be omitted for confidential evidence; the digest still binds it.
Issuer
issuer
RequiredWho makes the attestation: name, contact, and relationship to the operator.
Attestation level
level
RequiredA1, A2 or A3, as defined above.
Method
method
RequiredHow the issuer checked the evidence, in one or two sentences.
Scope
scope.checked / scope.unchecked
RequiredWhat the attestation covers and, as importantly, what it does not.
Dates
issued_at / valid_until
RequiredWhen it was made, and when it should be treated as stale (no later than the record’s reassess_by).
Signature
signature
OptionalA detached JWS (RFC 7515, EdDSA) over the canonical JSON (RFC 8785) of the attestation without this field. The OCC register signs every public attestation it publishes (key at /occ/jwks.json). An issuer’s own signature stays optional in v0.1 while issuer key discovery is under comment.
Withdrawal
withdrawn_on / withdrawn_note
OptionalSet when the issuer or operator withdraws the attestation. The attestation stays published with the date and reason: withdrawal is recorded, not erased.
Rules

Six rules

Digest binds the artefact

An attestation without a digest is an opinion about evidence, not an attestation of it. Every attestation names the exact artefact by its SHA-256 digest.

Weigh, do not count

One independent reproducible test outweighs many self-attested assertions. Weight follows the AIE-12 class first and the attestation level second.

Unchecked scope is mandatory

An attestation must say what it did not check. A blank unchecked scope is treated as a defect in the attestation.

Staleness

An attestation expires at its valid_until date or when the subject record has a material change, whichever comes first.

Revocable

An issuer may withdraw an attestation at any time. Withdrawal is recorded, not erased, and follows the T-RUE pattern where attestations are chained.

Not a mark

An attestation supports a claim. It is not certification, approval or endorsement by OCC or by the issuer.

Example

An independent attestation of a revocation test

{
  "occ_attestation": "0.1",
  "subject": {
    "record_id": "https://openconformance.org/occ/records/OCC-AR-EXMP-L001",
    "control": "T5 · revocation tested"
  },
  "evidence": {
    "class": "Reproducible test",
    "digest": "sha256:9f2c4e1a7b3d5f6e8a0c2b4d6f8e1a3c5b7d9f0e2a4c6b8d0f1e3a5c7b9d2f4e",
    "location": "https://example.org/evidence/revocation-test-2026-09-30.pdf"
  },
  "issuer": {
    "name": "Example Testing Lab",
    "contact": "[email protected]",
    "relationship": "independent"
  },
  "level": "A3",
  "method": "Re-ran the operator’s revocation script against a staging copy; confirmed the credential was rejected within 40 seconds at every downstream tool.",
  "scope": {
    "checked": "Revocation of the agent’s primary credential across three integrated tools.",
    "unchecked": "Cached sessions older than 24 hours; third-party sub-agents."
  },
  "issued_at": "2026-10-01",
  "valid_until": "2027-04-01"
}
Register signing is live; issuer signatures stay optional
Since Phase 6 the OCC register signs every public Agent Record and attestation it publishes: a detached JWS (EdDSA) over the canonical JSON, verifiable against the register key set or on the verify page. That proves the register published the content unaltered; it is not endorsement. An issuer’s own signature stays optional until issuer key discovery has been through public comment. The digest is required now, and the portal can compute it in your browser without uploading the file.
Post-quantum readiness
Each register signature now comes in two forms over the same bytes: Ed25519 (signature) and ML-DSA-65, the NIST FIPS 204 post-quantum standard (signature_pq). Either one verifies the attestation. NIST’s draft transition plan (IR 8547) and the Australian Signals Directorate both point to moving off traditional public-key signatures around 2030. See post-quantum readiness and key policy (OCC-E-015).